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Difference-in-differencesExcessive sickness absence may hurt productivity and put a strain on public ﬁnances. One explanation put
forward for increasing absence rates is that a tougher labour market represents a health hazard. A competing
hypothesis is that loss of job security works as a disciplinary device. We use a ﬁnancial shock that hit the public
sector in Norway in 2007 in some, but not all, municipalities to identify the effect of reduced job security on
sickness absence. Public sector workers in municipalities that were not affected are used as a control group in
a difference-in-differences analysis. In addition, trends in sickness absence of public and private sector employees
are compared, in a triple difference-in-differences analysis. We ﬁnd that sickness absence among public
employees decreased considerably in the year after the shock in the affected municipalities. The results survive
a number of robustness checks. The evidence is strongest for women, and consistent with a hypothesis that
reduced job security has a disciplining effect.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
When theUnited States housing bubble of the early 2000sﬁnally burst
in 2007, itsworldwide repercussionsultimately triggered theﬁnancial cri-
sis of 2008–09. A somewhat surprising example of investors facing heavy
losses at this time was a group of eight municipalities in energy-rich
Norway, which turned out to have invested expected future earnings
fromhydro-electric power plants in high-riskﬁnancial products. These af-
fected municipalities were obliged to cut running expenses at short no-
tice, and the so-called ‘Terra crisis’ named after Terra Securities, the
brokerage house that sold the ﬁnancial products, soon led to fears of job
losses, and activated public employee unions. The unexpected nature of
this particular ﬁnancial shock provides a good case for a natural experi-
ment, and in this paper, we exploit this feature of the events to investigate
how employees respond to reduced job security.
After theﬁrst disclosure in aﬁnancial daily newspaper on 31October
2007, massive media coverage followed, as shown in Fig. 1. Typical. This is an open access article understatements were that this would harm service production in themunic-
ipalities involved, that this severely damaged their general reputation,
and that their inhabitants felt embarrassed. An investigation followed,
and in January 2008, the County Governor's ofﬁce concluded that the in-
vestments had not been in accordance with the Norwegian Local Gov-
ernment Act.
When the news broke, it was clear that the losses would be of
considerable magnitude, and the complexity of the ﬁnancial products in-
volved added to this uncertainty. This was especially so given that local
governments employ about 20%of theNorwegianwork-force,wages rep-
resent most municipal expenses, and thus jobs could be at risk in the af-
fected communities. Pertinently, the Norwegian central government did
not offer a bailout for the affected municipalities, but instead proposed
an amendment in the Local Government Act allowing them to cover any
losses over a period of up to 10 years instead of four, as previously stated.
The Norwegian Parliament passed this amendment in June 2008, only
two months after being proposed and without the customary hearings.
However, the option provided was generally unattractive because it im-
plied less municipal autonomy in economic matters.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Hits per month in Norwegian media database covering printed and web-based
newspapers, periodicals, radio, and television. Dotted line: at least one of the affected
municipalities mentioned. Solid line: dotted line requirement plus ‘Terra’.
Source: http://ret-web05.int.retriever.no/services/.
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truest sense of the word (Hofstad, 2008). When the extent of the ﬁnan-
cial problemswas revealed, union leaders representing most municipal
workers soon expressed concern that the cuts in expenses would affect
job security and working conditions. Thus, the Norwegian Terra crisis is
well suited to a case study of how economic uncertainty at the employer
level affects worker behaviour. In this paper, we focus on sickness ab-
senteeism, a much-debated problem causing concerns in several
European countries. In general, job-related shocks may inﬂuence sick-
ness absence by affecting health, e.g., by creating emotional stress. How-
ever, shocks may also affect the incentives to report sick if the worker
believes that there is a risk of down-sizing, and that absenteeism will
then affect the worker's personal risk of losing a job or threaten career
opportunities as the competition for attractive jobs becomes tougher.
These two channels are clearly not mutually exclusive, but we can
shed light on which channel dominates.
High absence rates may also account for large production losses
and strain public ﬁnances, with a number of different explanations
proposed: for a recent summary of the Norwegian case, see
Markussen et al. (2011). In this analysis, we aim to trace the causal
impact of job security on sickness absence exploiting the 2007–08
ﬁnancial shock to a speciﬁc group of local governments as a source of
exogenous variation.We argue that the ﬁnancial problems experienced
by these local governmentsmay have led to a reduction in perceived job
security by municipal workers, which in turn affected sick absence
behaviour, even though there were no consequences for sickness
compensation schemes. Overall, we ﬁnd evidence that average absence
days decreased after the shock by about 10% for female employees in
the affected municipalities. For male employees, we identify effects of
an even larger magnitude, but cannot discount that these may have
resulted from changes in the composition of male employees at the
time.
2. Related literature
Obviously, there is a strong health component in sickness absence,
but the opportunity cost of reporting sick also affects sick absence.
There is an extensive empirical literature that relates absence to eco-
nomic incentives, including Allen (1981), Dunn and Youngblood
(1986), Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), Barmby et al. (1991), Johansson
and Palme (2005), and Puhani and Soderlof (2010). For instance,
Johansson and Palme (1996) ﬁnd that a Swedish reform that made
absence more costly for workers served to reduce sickness absence. It
is of note that, for all practical purposes, Norwegian sickness insurance
involves 100% income replacement.
A number of existing studies also relate sickness absence to the
unemployment rate. For example, using a standard labour supplymodel, Leigh (1985) shows that if an increase in the unemployment
rate increases the perceived risk of job loss by workers, and a poor at-
tendance record likewise increases the probability of being ﬁred, then
under reasonable assumptions, an increase in the unemployment rate
reduces absenteeism. An analysis of US Panel Study of Income
Dynamics data supports this hypothesis. An alternative explanation
to the observed negative association between sickness absence and
the unemployment rate in some countries is that labour force composi-
tion varies over the business cycle as labour demand increases and
decreases, pushing less healthy workers out of the labour market in
market down-turns. However, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd compelling evidence
that composition alone explains procyclical absence variation.
For instance, Arai and Thoursie (2005) examine Swedish industry-
regional panel data and identify a negative relation between the share
of temporary contracts and the sick rate. They interpret this as evidence
that workers on temporary contracts have weaker incentives to report
sick, and thus the behaviour of marginal workers cannot explain ﬂuctu-
ations in the rate of absence. Askildsen et al. (2005) also ﬁnd a negative
effect of the local unemployment rate on sickness absence in a panel
study of Norwegian data, including in a subsample of stable workers.
More recently, a growing body of research connects sickness leave and
other social insurance plans to social norms and attitudes
(e.g., Lindbeck et al., 1999; Ichino and Maggi, 2000; Bamberger and
Biron, 2007; Rege et al., 2012). A strand of contributions in this body
of work aims to identify social interaction effects (Bradley et al., 2007;
Hesselius et al., 2009; Lindbeck et al., 2009). One such interaction is
‘learning’, in the sense that workers in the same ﬁrm display similar
absence behaviour. Another is the reciprocity between employer and
employee: if the employer treats the workers well, they may respond
by having fewer absences, whereas worsened conditions for workers
may induce their increased absence to retaliate or ‘get back at’ the
employer (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
The proposed behavioural link between the unemployment rate and
sickness absence is that a rise in unemployment affects theworker's risk
of job loss and thus ‘disciplines’ theworker to have fewer absences. If so,
we may argue, at least from the worker's perspective, that a negative
shock to the employer may have a similar effect if the worker believes
the shock implies the threat of organizational down-sizing. Adding to
the threat of losing a job are ﬁrm reorganizations that may also affect
workers. The literature therefore presents two competing hypotheses
for analysing the ﬁnancial troubles of the affected Norwegian munici-
palities in 2007–08. Both are relevant in a situation where employees
are concerned about their future, whether they believe that there is a
(greater) risk of job loss, or worry about an unfavourable change in
their working requirements. The ﬁrst hypothesis asserts that less secure
jobs will encourage workers to avoid absenteeism for the reasons
suggested, as supported by the aforementioned study by Arai and
Thoursie (2005). Elsewhere, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) examine
absence around a probationary period without restrictions on ﬁring
workers, and ﬁnd that when employment protection increases after
the probation period, absenteeism also increases. Lindbeck et al.
(2006) obtain similar results in the analysis of a change in Swedish
legislation that reduced job security. However, in a large-scale Norwe-
gian study byMarkussen et al. (2011), therewas no consistent evidence
that short-tenured workers have fewer certiﬁed absences than domore
secure workers.
The second competing hypothesis is that the insecurity and worry
associated with reorganization may themselves be a health hazard, as
indicated in the well-known Whitehall II studies (Ferrie et al., 1995,
1998a, 1998b). These longitudinal cohort studies examine the health
effects of the work environment among British white-collar civil
servants. The results indicate that employees threatened with or
experiencing early privatization or reorganization suffered deteriorat-
ing health when compared with a control group, without signiﬁcant
changes in health behaviour (e.g., smoking, alcohol use, etc.). In other
work, Røed and Fevang (2007) use register data and conclude that
Table 2
Average sickness absence by sector.
Men Women
Non-treated municipality Treated municipality Non-treated municipality Treated municipality
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
A. Municipal sector
Days of sickness absence 3.695 3.935 4.353 3.678 6.421 6.891 7.234 7.403
Incidence 0.043 0.042 0.056 0.047 0.076 0.075 0.094 0.089
Difference post-/pre-shock, days 0.240 −0.675 0.470 0.169
Difference-in-differences, days −0.915
(0.281)
−0.301
(0.184)
Difference post-/pre-shock, incidence −0.001 −0.009 −0.002 −0.005
Difference-in-differences, incidence −0.008
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.002)
B. Private sector
Days of sickness absence 3.512 3.568 3.132 3.561 5.229 5.429 5.140 5.440
Incidence 0.039 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.054 0.053 0.058 0.057
Individuals, municipal sector 13,989 12,219 1651 1421 55,664 49,934 6268 5544
Observations, municipal sector 102,780 46,321 11,995 5277 404,867 187,170 44,813 20,451
Individuals, private sector 85,760 72,853 13,597 11,850 48,704 40,715 7875 6588
Observations, private sector 629,696 277,476 99,318 45,061 355,535 153,882 56,980 24,825
Notes: All averages are per quarter. The computation of difference-in-differences is shown in italics, confer Eq. (1). Standard errors of difference-in-differences, estimated in a separate
regression, are in parentheses. “Pre” is periods within the years 2006 and 2007; “Post” is 2008. The columns labelled “Treated municipality” report means for employees whose work-
place is located in a municipality impacted by the ﬁnancial shock.
Table 1
Background characteristics.
Variables Work-place in treated municipality Work-place in non-treated municipality
Municipal sector Private sector Municipal sector Private sector
1 if female; otherwise 0 0.792 0.367 0.799 0.362
Year of birth; otherwise 0 1962.3 1966.7 1961.3 1966.3
1 if information on education missing; otherwise 0 0.020 0.040 0.022 0.042
1 if 10 years of schooling or less; otherwise 0 0.108 0.196 0.106 0.228
1 if 11–13 years of schooling; otherwise 0 0.436 0.587 0.437 0.575
1 if 14–16 years of schooling; otherwise 0 0.218 0.128 0.217 0.113
1 if 17 years of education or more; otherwise 0 0.218 0.048 0.218 0.042
Number of children less than 15 years of age; otherwise 0 0.734 0.677 0.715 0.662
1 if never married by period t; otherwise 0 0.288 0.428 0.269 0.445
1 if married by period t; otherwise 0 0.561 0.465 0.591 0.447
1 if separated, divorced or widowed by period t; otherwise 0 0.152 0.107 0.140 0.108
Number of individuals 7,919 21,472 69,653 134,464
Notes: Pre-shock levels.
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employed by municipalities implementing down-sizing or signiﬁcant
staff reshufﬂing in their unit during an eight-year period. The present
study differs from Røed and Fevang (2007) in that we exploit the infor-
mation entailed in an external shock and not just in a particular
occupation.1 Hospitals are the most important exception, being enterprises owned by the state.3. Institutional background
Norwegian sickness insurance is mandatory and regulated by
law, covering all employees who have been with the same employer
for at least two weeks, with sickness coverage of 100% from the ﬁrst
day. A medical certiﬁcate is required for spells of absence of more
than three days. The ﬁrst 16 days of absence are paid by the employer
(the employer period), whereas the remaining period is paid by social
insurance, organized under the National Labour and Welfare Adminis-
tration (NLWA). Themaximum period of beneﬁts is one year, including
the employer period. Wage-earners' income taxes and employers'
payroll taxes jointly bear the cost of the NLWA. Clearly, the compensa-
tion scheme as it stands is very generous, and compared with most
other countries, absence rates are high. During the past 10 years, certi-
ﬁed sickness absence has ﬂuctuated around 6–7%, peaking in 2003 at
almost 7.5%. As expected, public expenditures for the programme (notincluding the employer period) are also substantial, comprising about
2.5% of GDP.
Measures to reduce sickness absence have been on thepolicy agenda
for several years, but suggestions to reduce the replacement ratio or to
increase the employer period have proved highly controversial. In
2001, the introduction of the so-called Including Working Life agree-
ment, signed by the government and employer and worker organiza-
tions aimed to reduce sickness absence by 20% from its 2001 level. The
agreement did not involve any changes in replacement rates, but did
emphasize improving working conditions and better follow-up of
sick-listed workers. In the last quarter of 2012, the absence rate was
only 5.6%. However, while this was down from its 2001 level, the reduc-
tion resulted not from the agreement but to a tightening of doctor
certiﬁcation rules in 2003 (Markussen, 2009). Other aspects of worker
protection in Norway are also quite strong. In particular, there are
restrictions on dismissing workers on sick-leave.
Norway has a large public sector, with public consumption
representing almost 30% of GDP. The municipalities provide the main
public services,1 either producing services themselves, purchasing
services from the private sector, or producing services in co-operation
with other municipalities. Municipalities also employ about 20% of the
Table 3
Effect of the ﬁnancial shock on sickness absence in the public sector. Difference-in-
differences.
Men Women
OLS FE OLS FE
Outcome
Days −1.024⁎⁎
(−2.33)
−0.997⁎⁎⁎
(−2.81)
−0.512⁎⁎
(−2.20)
−0.738⁎⁎⁎
(−3.37)
Incidence −0.012⁎⁎
(−2.19)
−0.011⁎⁎
(−2.22)
−0.006⁎
(−0.71)
−0.006
(−0.77)
Control variables
Background variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend, dummies for quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra trend for impacted
employers
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 166,373 166,373 657,301 657,301
Individuals 15,645 15,645 61,987 61,987
Notes: t-statistics clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.
Columns show results from the OLS and the ﬁxed effects (FE) estimator, respectively.
Control variables include education, polynomial of age, marital status, and number of
children.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table 4
Effect of the ﬁnancial shock on sickness absence in the public sector. Triple difference-in-
differences (municipal vs. private sector).
Men Women
OLS FE OLS FE
Outcome
Days −1.017⁎⁎
(−2.26)
−1.245⁎⁎⁎
(−3.51)
−0.609⁎⁎
(−2.16)
−1.038⁎⁎⁎
(−4.01)
Incidence −0.009
(−1.61)
−0.010⁎
(−1.81)
−0.005
(−0.60)
−0.005
(−0.63)
Control variables
Background variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend, dummies for quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra trend for impacted
employers
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,217,924 1,217,924 1,248,523 1,248,523
Individuals 115,027 115,027 118,582 118,582
Notes: See notes accompanying Table 3.
114 E. Bratberg, K. Monstad / Labour Economics 33 (2015) 111–120Norwegianwork-force. As noted, the affectedmunicipalities had specu-
lated in future revenues from hydro-electric power production. Norway
is rich in water-power, and speciﬁc legislation regulates proﬁt sharing
between the producer, the state, and local municipalities hosting
power plants, so that the latter are secured a part of ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
The municipalities impacted by the Terra crisis are spread throughout
the country, although it could be the case that workers employed by
municipalities with power production revenues differ from the typical
municipal worker. To deal with this possibility, our control group is
not the full pool of municipal workers (Norway has 430 individual
municipalities) but rather workers in municipalities that have revenues
from hydro-electric energy production. The number of control munici-
palities is much larger than the number of affected municipalities. In
the aftermath of the crisis, it became clear that the ﬁnancial products
had been very actively promoted by two brokers in Terra Securities
and that the competence for assessing risky ﬁnancial products was
low in the eight affectedmunicipalities. However, we cannot determine
why the leadership in somemunicipalities chose to invest in these risky
assets while others did not (Hofstad, 2008).
4. Empirical strategy
Our source of exogenous variation in job security is the ﬁnancial
shock that hit eight Norwegian municipalities in the late autumn of
2007. Employees of other energy-rich municipalities were unaffected
by the shock and serve as a control group in this natural experiment.
We take advantage of this feature by employing a standard difference-
in-differences (DID) approach. Furthermore, private sector workers in
these eight municipalities were also unaffected by the shock, a fact
that may be exploited in a triple difference (DDD) set-up. In what
follows, we use the standard term ‘treatment’ for exposure to the
shock. We ﬁrst consider DID. This estimator compares the average
outcome in the treated group to the average in the untreated group,
before and after an event exogenous to the group assignment. Let Y
denote the outcome (sickness absence), T and C the treatment and
control groups, respectively, and let subscripts 0 and 1 denote the pre-
and post-treatment periods. TheDID estimator of the average treatment
effect is then:
δ^DD ¼ YT1−YT0
 
− YC1−Y
C
0
 
: ð1ÞIn our analysis, we consider municipal sector workers only. The
identifying assumption is that the expected change in outcomes for
the control group is the same as it would have been for the treatment
group in the absence of treatment. Our choice of comparison group
relies on assuming that employees in the non-treated municipalities
did not expect exposure to similar shocks. We believe this assumption
is reasonable in that it became quite clear from the extensive media
coverage which particular municipalities had exposed themselves to
high-risk ﬁnancial products. However, if there was a ‘spillover of fear’
we would expect it to diminish the difference in behavioural responses
between workers in the affected and non-affected municipalities, and
our effect estimate would exhibit a downwards bias. Technically, there
could have been indirect effects for allmunicipalities with a full bailout
by the central government. However, it seems unlikely that even this
would affect the behaviour of the ordinarymunicipal worker (assuming
that the losses in the eight affected municipalities were averaged across
all 430 municipalities); however, even if it did, the bias would be
negative.
With multiperiod data, we can readily incorporate trends in the
model. Using quarterly data 2006–08, we estimate the DID effect from
the following regression model for individual i in period t= 1,…, 12:
Yit ¼ α0 þ α1Dit þ δ0POSTt þ δ1POSTtDit þ γ0t þ γ1Ditt
þ
X4
j¼2θ jQ j þ βXit þ εit ; ð2Þ
whereDit is a dummy variable indicating that individual iwas employed
in one of the affected municipalities in period t, POSTt is a dummy
variable that equals one for periods after the shock and otherwise
zero, Qj is quarter j (to control for seasonal variation in sickness
absence), X is a vector of individual characteristics, and εit is the random
error term. This model allows for different time trends and intercepts
for the treatment and control groups, and the treatment effect, δ1, is
modelled as the post-treatment shift in the treatment group mean.
We estimate Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares (OLS) and ﬁxed effects
(FE) estimators. The FE estimator allows for unobserved time-invariant
individual heterogeneity.
A potential pitfall of this approach is that even though the ﬁnancial
shock was unexpected, workers may have already self-selected into
the Terra municipalities. We address this objection in several ways.
First, the comparison group is selected frommunicipalities with similar
characteristics as the exposed (see Section 5 for details). Second, we
have tried to check whether employees in impacted municipalities
had reasons to feel greater job security than employees of control mu-
nicipalities, pre-shock. When comparing mean level and growth of
gross expenditure pre-shock as well as the net growth in number of
jobs, we ﬁnd no such indications. Furthermore, the FE estimator
Table 5
Placebo shock. Difference-in-differences.
Post-shock periods set to periods 5–8 Post-shock periods set to periods 5–12
Men Women Men Women
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
a) Days of absence
Placebo effect −0.115
(−0.23)
−0.106
(−0.22)
−0.405
(−1.23)
−0.318
(−1.18)
Placebo effect 0.707
(0.87)
0.678
(0.99)
0.329
(1.28)
0.581⁎⁎
(2.15)
b) Incidence
Placebo effect 0.004
(0.40)
0.002
(0.17)
−0.006
(−0.88)
−0.006
(−0.90)
Placebo effect 0.008
(0.81)
0.006
(0.65)
0.002
(0.64)
0.003
(0.79)
Observations 114,775 114,775 449,680 449,680 166,373 166,373 657,301 657,301
Individuals 15,640 15,640 61,932 61,932 15,645 15,645 61,987 61,987
Notes: See notes accompanying Table 3.
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instance, if the affected municipalities had particularly lax (or strict)
practices regarding sickness absence that attractedworkers with partic-
ular attitudes, we difference such unobserved characteristics out of the
model. The same argument applies to any differences in individual pref-
erences or health endowments.
A drawback of the DID set-up is that only public sector workers
are included in the analysis. By applying a DDD estimator, private
sector workers may also be included. Letting T and C denote the same
municipalities as before and using Δ ¼ Y1−Y0, we may write the
estimator as:
δ^DDD ¼ ΔT;Pub−ΔT; Priv
 
− ΔC;Pub−ΔC; Priv
 
: ð3ÞTable 6
Omitting municipalities. Difference-in-differences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Days of absence
Men
Treatment effect, OLS −1.154⁎⁎⁎
(−2.61)
−1.193⁎⁎
(−2.28)
−1.092⁎⁎
(−2.43)
−1.057⁎⁎
(−2.32)
−1.17
(−2.3
Treatment effect, FE −1.105⁎⁎⁎
(−3.13)
−1.127⁎⁎⁎
(−2.71)
−1.049⁎⁎⁎
(−2.90)
−1.047⁎⁎⁎
(−2.89)
−1.02
(−2.4
Women
Treatment effect, OLS −0.490⁎⁎
(−2.00)
−0.687⁎⁎⁎
(−2.76)
−0.483⁎⁎
(−2.04)
−0.509⁎⁎
(−2.08)
−0.61
(−2.3
Treatment effect, FE −0.726⁎⁎⁎
(−3.16)
−0.921⁎⁎⁎
(−4.51)
−0.721⁎⁎⁎
(−3.23)
−0.752⁎⁎⁎
(−3.27)
−0.76
(−2.9
Incidence
Men
Treatment effect, OLS −0.014⁎⁎⁎
(−2.74)
−0.011
(−1.57)
−0.013⁎⁎
(−2.48)
−0.012⁎⁎
(−2.11)
−0.01
(−2.7
Treatment effect, FE −0.013⁎⁎⁎
(−2.91)
−0.009
(−1.46)
−0.012⁎⁎
(−2.53)
−0.011⁎⁎
(−2.21)
−0.01
(−2.7
Women
Treatment effect, OLS −0.008
(−0.90)
−0.014⁎⁎
(−2.15)
−0.007
(−0.75)
−0.005
(−0.61)
−0.00
(−0.2
Treatment effect, FE −0.009
(−1.00)
−0.014⁎⁎
(−2.06)
−0.007
(−0.81)
−0.006
(−0.70)
−0.00
(−0.2
Municipality excluded
Kvinesdal Haugesund Vik Bremanger Nar
Observations, men 165,420 161,937 165,732 165,645 162,46
Individuals, men 15,555 15,227 15,584 15,576 15,26
Observations, women 652,326 639,166 654,466 653,343 643,87
Individuals, women 61,525 60,215 61,719 61,624 60,68
Notes: See notes accompanying Table 3.This estimator compares the DID between the public and the private
sector in the treated municipalities to the corresponding DID in the
control municipalities. The identifying assumption now is that the
expected DID between the public and the private sector is the same
for the control group as it would have been for the treatment group if
untreated. This assumption may be problematic if there are spillover
effects between sectors, e.g., if absence is contagious in neighbourhoods
similarly to Rege et al.'s (2012) ﬁndings for disability retirement.
However, if private sector absence actually ﬂuctuated in the same direc-
tion as public sector absence after the shock, we would expect the esti-
mated effect to be downwards biased. That is less worrying than a case
where we suspect that the effect is over-estimated.
In a regression framework, let the dummy variable P indicate a
worker in the public (municipal) sector, such that P = 0 represents a(6) (7) (8) (9)
5⁎⁎
0)
−1.011⁎⁎
(−2.24)
−0.762⁎
(−1.88)
−0.711
(−1.55)
−1.817⁎⁎⁎
(−3.53)
9⁎⁎
0)
−0.994⁎⁎⁎
(−2.74)
−0.748⁎⁎
(−2.52)
−0.846⁎⁎
(−1.98)
−1.491⁎⁎⁎
(−2.88)
5⁎⁎
7)
−0.539⁎⁎
(−2.25)
−0.382⁎⁎
(−2.00)
−0.460⁎
(−1.71)
−0.904⁎⁎⁎
(−3.16)
9⁎⁎⁎
6)
−0.752⁎⁎⁎
(−3.36)
−0.629⁎⁎⁎
(−3.32)
−0.685⁎⁎⁎
(−2.75)
−1.063⁎⁎⁎
(−4.25)
5⁎⁎⁎
1)
−0.012⁎⁎
(−2.16)
−0.011⁎
(−1.84)
−0.007
(−1.34)
−0.019⁎⁎⁎
(−3.68)
3⁎⁎⁎
1)
−0.011⁎⁎
(−2.17)
−0.010⁎
(−1.85)
−0.007
(−1.30)
−0.016⁎⁎⁎
(−3.38)
2
0)
−0.007
(−0.78)
−0.006
(−0.65)
0.000
(0.04)
−0.015⁎⁎
(−2.20)
2
3)
−0.007
(−0.83)
−0.007
(−0.74)
−0.000
(−0.00)
−0.015⁎⁎
(−2.09)
vik Hattfjelldal Hemnes Rana Kvinesdal, Haugesund, and Narvik
1 165,910 165,184 161,423 157,072
3 15,596 15,532 15,176 14,755
6 655,818 652,630 641,519 620,766
9 61,849 61,540 60,461 58,455
Table 7
Stable workers. Difference-in-differences estimates. Fixed-effects estimator.
(1) (2) (3) Main results
Days of absence
Men −0.609 −0.535 −0.57⁎ −0.994⁎⁎⁎
Women −0.658⁎⁎⁎ −0.698⁎⁎ −0.858⁎⁎ −0.740⁎⁎⁎
Incidence
Men −0.010⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎
Women 0.000 −0.003 −0.004 −0.007
Observations, men 126,468 137,928 142,001 166,373
Individuals, men 10,539 11,712 12,126 15,645
Observations, women 484,416 536,692 558,456 657,301
Individuals, women 40,368 45,666 47,887 61,987
Notes: t-statistics clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Subsamples:
Column 1: Employed 2006q1–2008q4 in the same municipality as at 31 December
2006.
Column 2: Employed 2007q1–2008q4 in the same municipality as at 31 December
2006.
Column 3: Employed 2008q1–2008q4 in the same municipality as at 31 December
2006.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Fig. 2.Municipal gross expenditure growth per capita.
116 E. Bratberg, K. Monstad / Labour Economics 33 (2015) 111–120private sector worker. The estimated equation is:
Yit ¼ α0Pit þ α1PitDit þ α2 þ α3Dit þ δ0PitPOSTt þ δ1PitPOSTtDit
þδ2POSTt þ δ3POSTtDit þ ΓP þ Γ−P þ βXit þ εit ;
ð4Þ
where ΓP and Γ−P contain the trend and quarter terms for the public and
the private sector, respectively. The treatment effect δ1 now measures
the effect of the shock on sickness absence by public sector workers in
the affected municipalities, net of any general effects that could also
have affected private sector workers.
5. Data
The key data source is the administrative registers from Statistics
Norway, which comprise the full population and enable us to link data
on employers with data on sickness absence (more than 16 days) for
the same individual. We identify all individuals who held a job in the
treated or control municipalities by 31 December 2006 (almost one
year prior to the ﬁnancial shock). As noted in Section 3, we limit the
controls to workers in municipalities that gain income from hydro-
electric power production, comprising 167 municipalities in addition
to the eight affected municipalities. We exclude employees older than
66 years from the sample. In this sample, we identify municipal and
private sector workers. Municipal workers are used in the DID analysis,
and the full sample is used for the DDD.
This dataset and the individual-level data on sickness absence from
the NLWA can be merged by means of the personal identiﬁer. The
absence data draw on sickness insurance payments from the NLWA,
which as discussed in Section 3 are from the third week of absence.
We include only absence episodes caused by the employee's own
sickness, i.e., we ignore absence resulting from the illness of family
members. For details on sample selection, see Table A1. We measure
sickness absence during 12 three-month periods, i.e., January 2006–
December 2008. This procedure leaves us with a dataset of 233,609
individuals for the analysis, 77,632 employed in the municipal sector
and 155,977 in the private sector. While employment status on 31
December 2006 determines inclusion in the sample, periods out of
employment are not included; thus, the panel is unbalanced.
The treatment group comprises 7925 individuals. Our control group
includes 69,707 employees of 167municipalities that are comparable in
the sense that they receive income from hydro-electric energy produc-
tion. Thesemunicipalities are located across all regions of Norway,while
four of the affected municipalities are located in southern or western
Norway, and the remainder in the same large county in northernNorway. With the DDD approach, we also include 21,480 private sector
workers in the affected (treatment) municipalities and 134,497 in the
control municipalities.
Table A2 details the data on the eight affectedmunicipalities.Munic-
ipalities 2, 5, and 8 are medium-sized towns by Norwegian standards,
with the rest relatively sparsely populated. The ﬁnancial losses in
2007 and 2008 were of considerable magnitude for most of these
municipalities, as shown in Table A2. Reduced expenditure in future
budgets was required to cover the loss recorded in 2007. Fig. 2 shows
that the average expenditure growth per capita was lower in the
affected municipalities than in the control group in 2008 and 2009.
We consider two outcomes: i) the number of days of certiﬁed sick-
ness absence per quarter, and ii) a dummy variable indicating that an
absence spell starts in a given quarter (incidence). As noted, the absence
data do not include the initial 16 days of each spell of absence covered
by the employer, as is also the case in previous research using Norwe-
gian data, such as Askildsen et al. (2005) and Røed and Fevang (2007).
It may seem problematic that we do not have information on the ﬁrst
two absence weeks. However, it appears reasonable that the negative
effect on absence (disciplining)would also showup in shorter absences,
so if we identify a negative effect in long-term absences, we would also
expect the effect on total absence to be negative. Conversely, if we iden-
tify a positive (or zero) effect on long-term absences, we may have
missed a potential disciplining effect for short-term absences. We
return to this issue later. From the worker's point of view, there is no
change in the sick pay scheme, and thus no change in incentives, at
the 16th day of absence.
We deﬁne the respective pre- and post-shock periods as Q1 2006–
Q4 2007 and Q1–Q4 2008. Media reports on the ﬁnancial losses
commenced in November 2007, but it seems reasonable that we
would observe any potential effects on the level of absence no sooner
than the following quarter.
Table 1 details background characteristics by sector and municipal-
ity category. We note that within each sector, the groups are similar
with respect to age, education, and family characteristics. However, in
the municipal sector, the proportion of female employees is higher,
along with the average age and the level of education. Table A3 shows
the occupational distribution within the municipal sector. Here we
note a gender difference, with strongermale representation in adminis-
tration, whereas women are concentrated in health care and day-care
centres. However, the distributions are quite similar in the control and
treatment groups.
Table 2 details the average absence levels before and after the shock
by gender, sector, and category of municipality. As shown, the level of
absence is generally higher for women than for men. In the municipal
sector, we note that the pre-shock absence levels are higher in the
impacted municipalities for both genders. Moreover, among men, days
absent decrease after the shock in the treatment group, but increase in
the control group. Amongwomen, days absent increase for both groups
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Fig. 3.Mean number of days of absence 2006–08, by gender, period, and treatment status.
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117E. Bratberg, K. Monstad / Labour Economics 33 (2015) 111–120after the shock, but less in the treated municipalities. Incidence
decreases in all groups, but the most among the treated. Accordingly,
when we compute simple DID estimates based on these averages they
are negative, suggesting negative effects of the shock. The effect is
particularly large for men (−0.9 days from a pre-shock level of 4.4)
and is statistically signiﬁcant. In the private sector, absence levels are
more similar across the various municipality categories.
Figs. 3–6 depict the mean absenteeism by gender in the public and
private sectors during the observation period, adjusted for seasonal
variation. Fig. 3 shows absence days in the public sector. For both
genders, absence decreased in 2008, but apparently more so in the
affected municipalities. Average incidence, displayed in Fig. 4, reveals
a similar tendency for women. For men, the picture is less clear: in the
treatment group, incidence fell at the beginning of 2008 but then
increased, while there is no clear trend in the control group. Figs. 5
and 6 display the corresponding averages for the private sector. Notably,
the patterns are much more similar in the treated and non-treated
municipalities for private than for public sector workers. This observa-
tion is well in accordance with our assumption that the shock only af-
fected employees in the public sector.
Our main impression from the descriptive statistics is that sickness
absence reduced for public employees in the affected municipalities,
most clearly for men and more distinctly for days absent than for inci-
dence. In the next section, we investigate whether this ﬁnding also
appears in a regression-based approach including control variables..
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Fig. 4.Mean incidence 2006–08, by gender, period, and treatment status.6. Estimation results
In this section, we report gender-wise regression results for DID
(Eq. 2) and DDD (Eq. 4). We estimate both models using OLS and indi-
vidual FE for both outcomes (absence days and incidence). In the OLS
regressions, we control for age, education, marital status, and the
number of children, in addition to the quarter and time period. In the
FE regressions, we exclude most of the controls because they do not
vary over time.
Table 3 provides DID estimates for absence days and incidence. We
only report the estimate for the parameter of interest, δ1 in Eq. (2) and
the t-statistics, estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level. For absence days, the post-shock effect is statistically
signiﬁcant and larger for men than for women, as with the descriptive
statistics. The FE estimates are −0.997 and −0.738 for men and
women, respectively. These are larger in magnitude than the simple
estimates in Table 1, particularly for women. For women, the FE
estimate is also clearly larger than the OLS estimate. In general, we
have more conﬁdence in the FE estimate because it controls for unob-
served heterogeneity. A number of factors may affect sickness absence,
e.g., health and attitudes, and as such, the case for using the FE estimator
appears particularly strong. The relative changes are substantial: a
decrease of 10% for women and 23% for men when compared with the
average pre-shock levels.
As ‘incidence’ is a discrete outcome, we interpret the coefﬁcients as
marginal effects on the probability of commencing an absence spell.2
Here, the estimated effect is statistically signiﬁcant only for men: a
decrease of 1.1 percentage points with FE. As shown, the point estimate
for women is larger than the corresponding ﬁgure in Table 2, but is
statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 4 reports theDDD results from estimating Eq. (4). As theﬁnan-
cial shock affected the public sector, we expect a difference in the
public–private outcomes for the Terra municipalities. The DDD estima-
tor compares this difference to the corresponding difference in the
control municipalities (where the public sector was unaffected by the
shock). As it turns out, the DDD point estimates are quite similar to
those in the previous table, larger for men than for women, but signiﬁ-
cant only for absence days. The FE estimates are also somewhat larger
than the correspondingDID results,−1.3 formen and−1.0 forwomen.2 We donot apply non-linear probabilitymodels such as logit or probit because it is eas-
ier to implement a ﬁxed effects estimator in a linear model. The linear probability model
has the disadvantage that it may predict outcomes outside the unit interval; however,
the focus here is on marginal effects.
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absence spells: that is, there is a signiﬁcant reduction for both genders in
themunicipal sector in the treatment group. For incidence, the evidence
is less clear. Inspection of the graphs shows that the data are noisier. The
DID regressions suggested a negative effect, but this is statistically
signiﬁcant only for men, and the DDD results were insigniﬁcant (only
one coefﬁcient attained the 10% level of signiﬁcance). The reason may
be that we analyse sickness spells that last two weeks or more, and
reducing the duration is a smaller adjustment than skipping the sick-
ness episode altogether. Unfortunately, we do not have information
on absences of less than two weeks, so there may have been an effect
on the incidence of shorter spells of sickness that we cannot observe.
The gender differences are interesting. It is well known that women's
sickness absence levels are higher than men's (see, e.g., Vistnes, 1997;
Mastekaasa and Olsen, 1998; Markussen et al., 2011) and they also
appear less responsive to negative organizational shocks. However, we
cannot infer whether this is because of differences in job characteristics,
health, or attitudes.3
We performed several tests for robustness. First, Table 5 checks if
there is any effect of a placebo shock in the DID set-up. In this, we
redeﬁned the treatment dummy to equal one from Q1, 2007 onwards.
This is almost one year before the crisis, and we know of no other
particular events at the time that should have affected sickness absence
systematically. Thus, if this placebo treatment results in any effect, it
leads us to suspect that the effects revealed in Tables 2–4 are spurious.
In the left-hand panel of Table 5, we include only observations for Q1,
2006–Q4, 2007. There is no effect of the placebo treatment on either
outcome. In the right-hand panel, we also include 2008, such that the
treatment dummy equals one in both 2007 and 2008. All coefﬁcients
but one are also insigniﬁcant in this case. However, we should note
that the placebo in the right-hand panel in Table 5 is different in the
sense that observations from the true post-shock period are included.
Nonetheless, the overall impression from the placebo regressions is to
increase our conﬁdence in the main results.
As seen in Table A2, the affected municipalities range in size from
Hattfjelldal (1482 inhabitants) to Haugesund (32,303 inhabitants).
Their recorded losses and expenditure levels also vary. Thus, the results
may be sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of some municipalities. To
check this, we re-estimated the models, omitting one affected munici-
pality at a time. Table 6 provides the results. Compared with the main3 Table A3 shows that men and womenwork in different sectors within themunicipal-
ities, and women have a much higher frequency of part-time employment.results, the reduced samples produce quite similar results for absence
days and incidence, the exception being that excluding the second-
largest municipality, Rana (column 8), makes the effect on incidence
insigniﬁcant, but still negative. Furthermore, it appears that the strength
of the response relates to the size of the shock. Column 9 shows that
when we omit the municipalities where the recorded ﬁnancial losses
were smallest (in Kvinesdal, Haugesund and Narvik, as shown in
Table A2), the estimated effects generally increase in magnitude.
Even though we do not ﬁnd evidence at the aggregate level that
particular municipalities drive the results, it could be the case that
worker turn-over differs between the treatment and comparison
samples. If themost sick-proneworkers change sector, move to another
municipality, ormove out of employment completely, it could affect our
results. We address these pitfalls by: i) analysing subsamples of stable
workers, ii) comparing turn-over in the treatment and comparison
groups, and iii) looking at the absence histories ofworkerswho changed
employer in the post-shock period.
Table 7 shows FE regressions for absence days and incidence for the
subgroup of stable workers. Columns 1–3 detail the results for workers
who stayed with the same employer that they had in December 2006
continuously from January 2006 until December 2008 (column 1), in
2007 and 2008 (column 2), and in 2008 (column 3). Comparing these
results with the main results (reproduced in the ﬁnal column), we
ﬁnd that for days, the point estimates are quite similar, but signiﬁcant
only for women. However, the incidence estimates are almost
unchanged. We conclude that our main results are supported, but
with some uncertainty regarding a potential selection effect for men.
Fig. 7 depicts turn-over, deﬁned as the proportion of individuals in
each period not employed with the same employer as at 31 December
2006. The employer–employee relationship of that date is the basis for
the indicator for working in an affected municipality in Eq. (2). We
deﬁne turn-over separately for the subsamples of treated and non-
treated municipalities. As shown, the levels are somewhat higher in
the treatment group, but the trends are very similar. However, we also
estimated linear probability models for the probability of leaving a
public sector job in the affected municipalities (results not shown)
and found that men, but not women, actually had a higher probability
of leaving employment in the period after the shock.
Figs. 8 and 9 indicate absence trends before the shock for employ-
ment leavers and stayers. We plot absence days separately for stayers
and leavers, where we deﬁne leavers as workers employed by the
same municipality on 31 December 2006 but not on 1 January 2008.
We can see that the levels are somewhat higher for female stayers in
the affected municipalities than in the comparison group, but with no
clear difference in trends. For both genders, there is an upward shift in
2007 for leavers, and for men this shift is larger in the affected group
of municipalities. Thus, there is some evidence that there was a selec-
tion out of employment (or to other employers) for men who were
the most sick-prone before the ﬁnancial shock, and this may explain
the estimated absence reduction for men in the main sample. As we0
2006q1 2006q3 2007q1 2007q3 2008q1 2008q3
Controls Treated
Fig. 7. Turn-over by treatment status and period. Proportion of each subsample not
employed with the same employer as at 31 December 2006.
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119E. Bratberg, K. Monstad / Labour Economics 33 (2015) 111–120saw in Table 7, absence fell among stable workers, but the effect on
absence length appears mostly driven by women. Incidence, on the
other hand, decreased for men in the groups of stable workers.
Our main conclusion is that the ﬁnancial shock reduced sickness
absence among employees in the affected municipalities. After
inspecting selection out of the sample, the evidence of an effect on
stable workers is strongest for women. The placebo exercise provides
evidence against the effect being a time trend, and the conclusion is
robust to omitting municipalities or workers who changed
employment.
7. Concluding remarks
The ﬁnancial shock that hit some Norwegian municipalities in
2007–08 may have affected sickness absences of public employees
through several channels. Previous research suggests several primary
hypotheses. First, the crisis could have had a direct negative health
effect. Second, impacted workers may have felt less compelled to
restrain themselves from absence in response to the apparently
irresponsible ﬁnancial behaviour of their employers (the reciprocity
hypothesis). However, the fact that absence actually fell rejects these
hypotheses. Third, another hypothesis is that reduced absence resulted1
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Fig. 9. Pre-shock levels of sickness absence among women, by stability in employer–
employee relation, period, and treatment status.from changes in the composition ofworkers. There are some indications
of selection out of employment among men. Conversely, we also ﬁnd a
decrease in incidence among stable male workers.
Fourth, the prospect of jobs becoming less secure could have had a
disciplining effect leading to less absence. Our results are consistent
with this hypothesis and also agree with existing research concluding
that less secure job environments reduce sickness absence, whether
insecurity is brought about by rising unemployment rates (Arai and
Thoursie, 2005), probation (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) or the softening
of job security legislation (Lindbeck et al., 2006). Our conﬁdence in this
interpretation of the results is strengthened by the fact that the ﬁnancial
loss actually hampered economic activity in the municipalities affected
during the period studied and that the response is stronger in munici-
palities with a higher per capita loss. Moreover, the ﬁxed effects results
are purged of unobserved heterogeneity at the individual or municipal
level.
In our analysis, the data are at the individual level whereas the
negative shock is at the employer level, and the mechanism connecting
the two is not quite clear. Even so, we observe quite large effects, for
example, sickness absence fell as a result by about 10% for women.
The bad news became public in October–November 2007. The resultant
media coverage was extensive, and a statement in November from the
leader of the largest public employee union that cuts must not be at
the cost of workers, indicates that there was a fear of cuts. We ﬁnd
that sickness absence dropped from the ﬁrst quarter of 2008, but have
no evidence that the number of positions fell at that time. However, it
seems probable that the possibility of less secure jobs may have had a
disciplining effect that led to reduced sickness absence. Thus, it is the
expectation of future down-sizing that may have induced less absence,
not the down-sizing per se.
We should also note that what we have found is a short-run effect.
Unfortunately, the post-shock period for which data are available is
still too short to test for long-run effects. Moreover, it is most likely
that the effect of an expected reduction in job security is only temporary.
Overall, our results are not necessarily at odds with Røed and Fevang
(2007) who found that actual down-sizing increased absence among
Norwegian nurses. A possible mechanism is that the threat of future
downscaling provides workers with an incentive to reduce absence in
the short run, but that prolonged insecurity involves negative health
effects that dominate in the longer run.Appendix ATable A1
Sample selection.
Number of
employees, by sector
Municipal Private
Employed in the sector at 31 December 2006 370,834 1,190,549
Removed from sample because:
Employed in several municipalities with different
treatment status
−2,787 −659
Employed in several treated municipalities −3 −3
Aged 67 years or more in 2006 −744 −9,963
Other reason for sickness absence than own sickness −5,427 −23,438
Outlier, N20 sickness absence episodes 1992–2008 −1,919 −1,937
Employed both within and outside given sector −22,889 −30,772
Other reasons −444 −18,137
Total 336,621 1,105,640
From this dataset we extract
Treatment group: working in municipalities impacted
by shock
7,925 21,480
Control group: working in other municipalities that
receive income from hydro-electric power
69,707 134,497
Total 77,632 155,977
Dataset for analysis: 233,609 employees
Table A2
Municipalities affected by the ﬁnancial shock.
Municipality No. of
inhabitants,
December 2006
Gross expenditure per
capita, 2006, NOK 1000
Recorded loss per
capita, municipal
accounts, NOK 1000
2007 2008 2009
1 Kvinesdal 5,595 59 2.8 1.3 0.0
2 Haugesund 32,303 45 3.0 1.1 −0.7
3 Vik 2,835 64 23.8 12.5 0.0
4 Bremanger 3,930 63 46.2 14.9 0.0
5 Narvik 18,301 54 6.4 3.9 0.0
6 Hattfjelldal 1,482 71 86.8 −27.0 0.0
7 Hemnes 4,510 66 22.4 −7.0 0.0
8 Rana 25,190 47 10.1 −1.3 0.0
Notes: Data on recorded loss provided bymunicipal administrations. Per capita loss calcu-
lated using the number of inhabitants in 2006.
Table A3
Occupational distribution by gender, percent.
Men Women
Not
impacted
Impacted Not
impacted
Impacted
Technical personnel 8 8 0 0
Administration 28 24 11 10
Fire brigade 3 7 0 0
Teaching (compulsory school) 28 26 20 20
Health care (primary care and
nursing homes)
8 10 29 32
Home-care services, kindergartens 14 15 37 34
Other services 11 11 3 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Number of individuals 13,994 1,651 55,713 6,274
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